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SUMMARY 
This report presents information regarding the Ballantynes Department Store Fire 
Disaster, which occurred at Christchurch, New Zealand, on the 18th November 
1947. The complex was situated where the present building stands at the 
intersection of Cashel and Colombo Streets. 
The fire was first noticed at 3.31 p.m. approximately and the magnitude of the fire 
was such that within an hour an acre of building had been gutted by fire. The 
intensity of the blaze was such that flames were observed leaping 300 feet into the 
air from the top floors of the building at the height of the fire. Heat could be felt 
150 yards from the building. The pall of smoke was estimated to have been a 
mile wide and rising upwards of four to five thousand feet, and was visible thirty 
miles away. Over six thousand gallons of water per minute were used to fight the 
fire with no impact. Witnesses described fire spreading through the building "like 
a flame thrower". 
The report focuses on several aspects of this disaster: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Examination of the structural aspects and building features. 
Occupancy hazards applicable to Ballantynes at the time of the fire. 
Identification of circumstances as to how the building features contributed 
to the spread of the fire, and loss of life. 
By-laws, statutes and codes in force in 1947 relating to fire protection and 
prevention, safety of staff and safe means of egress and whether 
Ballantynes complied with such requirements. 
In conclusion we discuss how the fire could have been prevented from reaching 
the magnitude it did and how the tragic loss of life could have been averted. We · 
have not compared the Building and Egress Codes of 1947 with those existing 
today as our approach has been to demonstrate via the Ballantynes fire the 
hazards that caused this disaster to occur, with the result of the deaths of 41 
people trapped in the building. 
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Tragedy struck suddenly and swiftly in Christchurch when one of the worst fires in the history of New Zealand swept through the three-storied building of 
J. Ballantyne and Co., Ltd., one of the biggest and oldest-established clothing-businesses In the country. The large store and workrooms, covering a site of one 
acre, were quickly engulfed in flames and it was feared that tht:re would be additions to the death-roll of moro than 40 which was Issued the day after the flre. 
HEAVY DEATH-ROLL IN TRAGIC CHRISTCHURCH FIRE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Ballantynes Department Store Fire, which occurred at Christchurch on 
Tuesday the 18th November 1947, is one of New Zealand's greatest tragedies and 
one of the countries most disastrous fires. In the most tragic circumstances 41 
persons died ·and 2 were seriously ·injured as a result of being trapped in the 
building at the height of the fire. The fire destroyed an acre of building and 
caused damage in excess of £500,000, which in today's money terms would equate 
to over $6,000,000.00. ..; 
FIRE HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH RETAIL SHOPS AND 
DEPARTMENT STORES 
The major hazards and fire dangers prevalent in large retail shops and 
Department Stores, which cause fire or assist the spread of fire are generally 
recognised as being : 
1. Open plan designs tend to increase the general level of fire hazard and 
assist a rapid spread of fire. Premises are often arranged so that 
customers can see displays and have ready access and route to them. Sales 
are encouraged if customers have visual contact from counter to counter, 
and floor to floor. Lack of compartmentation in sales and display areas 
is a major hazard. 
2. A high proportion of goods sold in shops burn. In sales and display areas 
fire loads can be high and evenly spread. Fire loading by content can be 
categorised as : 
2.1 Ordinary Combustibles which may not be easily ignited will burn 
well once ignited. Wood, furniture, electrical goods, and plastic 
goods come within this category. 
2.2 Ordinary Combustibles which are easily ignited and burn rapidly. 
Clothing, fabrics, decorations, paper goods, fall within this category. 
2.3 Foams. Vinyls. Plastics - are easily ignitable and burn rapidly with 
intense heat producing thick smoke and toxic gases. Upholstered 
furniture, cushions, pillows, mattresses are examples. 
2.4 Flammable Liquids - are volatile, easily ignitable and explosive and 
add to fire intensity. Examples are nail varnishes and removers, 
scents, perfumes, spirits, solvents, liquers. 
2.5 Gas Containers - will explode when heated and contents may be 
inflammable. Examples are barbacue gas bottles, aerosols. 
2.6 Packaging - Nearly all types of packaging and· packaging materials 
are readily combustible and include plastic, cardboard, paper, and 
styrene packaging. 
·../ 
Department stores have by content extreme fire loadings because of the 
varied and diverse range of items sold. 
3. Display Areas can often be congested with products that are readily 
combustible. Large stores are constantly changing their displays, contents 
and customer density, particularly during sales periods or busy periods, i.e. 
Christmas, when stock holdings and holdings of bulk goods increase. v 
4. Stockrooms and Basements are also a major hazard. Research by the 
British Fire Service revealed that a high proportion of the most damaging 
fires break out in stockrooms and storage areas, because conditions in 
stock rooms assist fires to start and spread because of availability of 
combustible materials. It was found that not all stockrooms and 
basements are frequently visted, allowing a good opportunity for a fire to 
outbreak to remain undiscovered for some time. The research also 
revealed that undisturbed areas may be attractive to surrepitious smokers 
and provide uninterupted opportunity for an arsonist to set a fire. 
Absence of fire warning systems, and prevention systems in these areas was 
prevalent, particularly the absence of sprinklers in stock room shelving. 
5. Occupancy practices relating to smoking rules, keeping flammable goods 
clear of heat sources, regular maintenance and inspection of electrical and 
gas systems, clearance and regular disposal of waste packaging and 
rubbish, safe storage of volatile liquids, gases and chemicals and cooking 
and kitchen procedures were identified as other major hazards prevalent 
for retail shops and department stores. 
BUILDING DESCRIPTIONS AND CONSTRUCTION ASPECTS 
The company of J. Ballantyne and Co. Ltd was founded in 1874 as Milliners and 
Drapers. At the turn.of the 20th Century they occupied premises in Cashel Street 
- Colombo Street where the present building stands. The company progressively 
purchased adjacent buildings as the business expanded. 
At the time of the fire in 1947, the overall complex consisted of what were 
formerly eight separate buildings, into which large openings had been made in 
one time party walls, thereby effectively converting eight buildings into one large 
establishment and open area. 
The total area of the complex was 1,873,600 cubic feet. 
The group of buildings which formed the complex had a frontage of 165 feet in 
Colombo Street, and 265 feet in Cashel Street. The Colombo Street depth was 
133 feet, and there was a 69 foot frontage into Lichfield Street. 
Plan 1 is a general block plan of the premises prior to the fire. This report 
focusses on 3 of the buildings outlined in the block plan. (Reference: 
Ballantynes Fire Disaster, G.G. Walker, p.82). 
Building 1 
Building 2 
Building 3 
Congreves Building 
Goodmans Building 
Pratts Building 
Schedule A is a collation iri schedule form of the features and construction details 
of Blocks 1 to 3. The reference used was "The Description of Buildings 
Comprising the Premises of Messrs J. Ballantyne and Co.Ltd, as at 18th Day of 
November 1947", presented by Mr P.C. Cornish of the Public Works Department 
to the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The document "The Ballantynes Fire 
Disaster'' by G.G. Walker, pp.82 to 92 is reproduced as Schedule A. 
Schedule B is a collation in schedule form of the egress points and openings in 
Blocks 1 to 3. The same source is the same as used in Schedule A. 
Appendices D to G are the floor plans of Ballantynes Building, pre fire, which 
were obtained from records of the Christchurch Fire Service and prepared for the 
Royal Commission of Inquiry Into the Ballantynes Fire, by V.R.J. Hean. 
H-47 82 
APPEl\'DIX B.-DESCRIPTION OF BUILDINGS COMPRISING THE PREMISES 
OF MESSRS. J. BALLANT\"'1\E A:N'D CO., LTD., AS AT 18m DAY OF 
NOVEMBER, 1947 
Prepared by P. C. CoRNISH, A.N .Z.l.A., District Architect, Public W orb Department, 
Christehurrh, for the assistance of the Royal Commi.Bsion inquiring into the fatal 
fire oocurring on the 18th day of November, 1947, in the premises of Measrs. 
J. Ballantyne and Co., Ltd. 
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APPENDIX ~· CONSTRUCTION FEATURES OF BLOCKS 1 TO 3 
FEATURES 
STORIES 
WALLS 
WALL 
LININGS 
FLOORS 
ROOF 
CElLI NGS 
BASEMENT 
GROUND 
FLOOR 
FIRST FLOOR 
SECOND 
FLOOR 
THIRD FLOOR 
PARTITIONS 
BLOCK 1: CONGREVES BUILDING 
Colombo Street - Purchased in 1918 
3 Storey Block with Basement 
CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 
Brick with stone facade 
Mainly matchlining, pinex board 
on First Floor 
Wood on timber joists on rolled steel 
beams 
Timber framed - corrug~ted iorn 
skylights 
No ceiling 
Matchlining, pinex 
Matchlining, pinex 
No ceiling 
BASEMENT Wire mesh on wooden frames 
GROUND 
FLOOR Brick, timber covered with pinex 
BLOCK 2: GOODMANS BUILDING 
Colombo Street Built in 1904 
4 Storey Block with Basement 
separated from Congreves by brick 
party wall. 
CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 
Brick with stone facade 
Matchlining, Beaverboard, pinex 
Wood on timber joists. On upper 
floors wood on rolled steel beams 
Timber framed, corrugated iron 
skylights 
No ceiling 
Match lining 
Matchlining with pinex 
Matchlining 
Only ceiling cover over telephone 
Exchange 
Wire mesh on wooden frame 
Nil 
BLOCK 3: PRATTS BUILDING 
Colombo-Cashel Streets 
3 Storey Block with Baseme-nt 
separated by two solid brick walls. 
CONSTRUCTION DETAILS 
Concrete basement 
stone facade 
brick with 
Various - matchlining, Beaverboard, 
pinex and Celotex 
Wood on timber joists carried on 
timber beams. 
Timber framed, corrugated iron, 
45 foot long lantern light and 
penthouse over lift well 
No ceiling 
Matchlining 
Matchlining with pinex 
Celotex only 
Brick, 'timber, 
Beaverboard 
wood panelling, 
Fl RST FLOOR Pinex and Match lining 
SECOND 
FLOOR Matchlining 
THIRD FLOOR -
COMMENTS 
-2-
Nil 
Matchlining, pin ex I glass 
Matchlining 1 pinex 
Timber with plywood, matchlining, 
Plasterboard 
Timber framed with Celotex 
Accounts and Credit Office on 
Second floor separated from the 
block by a brick wall 
Schedule B 
Features 
Fire Escapes 
Lifts 
Stairs 
Openings 
MEANS OF EGRESS AND OPENINGS IN BUILDING 
Congreves Building 
Block 1 
Nil 
Nil 
Stairs were all timber anti not enclosed 
from basement to first floor. First to 
second floor stairs enclosed with timber 
partitioning with doors at head and foot 
of stairs. 
Goodmans Building 
Block 2 
Steel and caste iron stair with flights and 
landing accessible from second and third 
floors, access also available to second floor, 
Block 3, via sliding metal clad door. 
Access available to Block 3 via lavatory 
above strong room in Block 3. 
Access basement to third floor; shafts 
ground floor to third floor enclosed with 
pinex, and third floor shaft enclosed with 
pinex hardboard. Doors were wood with 
wire mesh panel. 
Stairs were all timber not enclosed from 
ground to third floor. From basement to 
ground floor stairs were timber closed at 
top with wooden door and spring closer. 
Pratts Building 
Block 3 
) 
Access from second and third floor (toilet 
only) to steel and caste iron fire escape on 
South Wall of building giving access from 
second and third floors only to a 3 foot 
wide alleyway between Block 2 and 2. No 
fire escape for first floor. 
Ground to second floor lift with shafts of 
pinex board, beaverboard and celotex. 
Doors of wood with wire mesh panels. 
Basement to first floor were timber and 
not enclosed. First to third floors were 
timber enclosed with timber partitions 
covered with Celotex. 
One basement opening to Block 2. 
Two ground floor openings to Block 2. 
Three openings on first floor to Block 
2. 
Hole cut between basement to Pratts. I Refer Goodmans Building. 
Smallest opening 6' x 4'6" - basement. 
Largest opening 12' x 10'6" -ground 
floor. 
Access to Block 3 under stairs on alleyway. 
Opening on 1st floor between Blocks 1 and 
3. Fire door access on 2nd floor to Block 
3. Indirect access to Block 3 on third floor 
via alleyway and fire escape. 
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BUILDING FEATURES 
The predominant features obvious from the Plans 1 to 5, and Schedules A and B 
are: 
1. The high fire load by way of wooden construction and partitioning. 
2. The unprotected vertical openings of stairways and liftwells. 
3. The absence of fire breaks in the roof. 
4. The lack of compartmentation on all floors. 
5. Unprotected lateral openings in brick separation walls, g1vmg access 
between the blocks 1, 2 and 3. 
6. The high fire load by content evident from the floor plans showing the 
sales areas, workrooms and administration areas. 
7. The high density of staff on the upper floors. 
8. The absence of fire escapes on the Colombo and Cashel Street frontages. 
9. The absence of fire doors and fire walls in the buildings. 
10. No protected external stairways. 
11. Much of the internal partitioning and some linings were untreated soft 
wood fibre. 
12. Unprotected openings on the fh:st floor between all three blocks. 
13. Open stairway to basement in Congreves Building had no Fire Stop. 
14. Unprotected opening in the dividing wall of the basement between 
Congreves and Goodmans building. 
15. Plan 4 - Temporary partitions on first floor separating Goodmans from 
Congreves building. 
16. Plan 4- No partitioning between Pratts and Goodmans on first floor thus 
large open display area. 
17. Plan 5 - Fire doors onto the alley fire escape between Pratts and 
Goodmans buildings. 
18. Plan 4 - First floor of Congreves Building was a temporary store and 
workroom and no staff were employed on that floor. 
FIRE LOADING OF BALLANTYNES BUILDING 
Based on evidence presented at the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the 
disaster, it was concluded that the total number of British Thermal Units available 
for the production of heat in the event of fi~e, was substantial. Approximations 
of British Thermal Units per square foot were. 
BRITISH 1HERMAL UNITS PER SQUARE FOOT 
Basement Ground First Second Third Roof 
Floor Floor Floor Floor 
Congreves 200,000 108,000 249,000 237,000 - 89,000 
Goodmans 65,000 213,000 244,000 224,000 226,000 79,500 
Pratts 278,000 200,000 217,000 308,000 - 79,000 
The total combustible contents of the building were taken into account and 
included floors, linings, fittings, furnishings, stock and plant. ~: 
0~\~ 
Note: A British Thermal Unit is defined as "One British Thermal Unit is the 
amount of heat required to raise the temperature of one pound of water 1 degree 
Fahrenheit (when the measurement is performed at 60°F). 
THE-ORIGIN AREA OF THE FIRE 
The origin area of the fire, was by later examination and investigation, 
determined to be in the basement of Congreves Building, which was where the 
smoke was first noticed. 
The basement was used as a storage area and contained bolts and rolls of carpet, 
furniture, wooden shelving and packaging. Its services included electrical wiring 
and cables, fuse boxes and gas mains and pipes. The staff employee who worked 
in the area, Mr K. Smith was a smoker. 
The basement was situated at the Southern end of Congreves Building and 
services were at the southern end of the basement. Access to the basement was 
available via an unprotected stairway from the ground floor in Congreves 
Building. Access to a basement in Goodmans was obtainable from the Congreves 
basement via an opening closed by a light wire mesh grille gate. 
An alleyway 3 foot wide separated Goodmans Building and Pratts Building. The 
basement of Goodmans building had an opening being cut out onto this alleyway 
which enclosed the fire escape from Pratts Building (refer floor plans). 
/ 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE FIRE 
With reference to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry for the Ballantynes 
Fire, extracts from the Christchurch Fire Service Watchroom Occurrence Book 
of the 18th November 1947, and eye witness accounts reported in the 
Christchurch Star Sun and Christchurch Press Newspapers, a chronology of events 
in respect of the fire has been reconstructed. 
TIME 
3.25 p.m. 
3.30 p.m. 
3.31 p.m. 
3.33 p.m. 
approx 
3.46 p.m. 
3.48 p.m. 
EVENT 
K. Smith, Basement Worker in Congreves Building goes to 
afternoon tea. There is no sign of fire in the basement on 
his departure. 
K Smith does not return to the basement, but leaves 
building to visit a friend. 
The first wisps of smoke are noticed coming from the cellar 
by a staff member who draws this to the attention of another 
employee, who visits the cellar to find hot smoke by the 
south wall. No flame or sound of fire is observed by the 
employee. It was noticed that lights in the basement were 
surging. The employee returned to the ground floor asking 
if staff had advised the Fire Brigade and Management of the 
fire. 
Mr .Stringer, the employee involved, returned to the cellar 
with a fire extinguisher to find the smoke was more dense 
and he could hear the fire crackling. The smoke was 
described as having a "tarry" smell by Mr Stringer. Another 
staff member arrived in the cellar to assist, at which time the 
lights in the cellar failed. Both returned to the ground floor. 
Management were also arriving at the area and a principal 
Roger Ballantyne asked if the Fire Service had been called. 
He was told they had been. Ballantyne instructed a staff 
member to advise the Fire Service, to ensure that they had 
been alerted. He and other staff went to the cellar with fire 
extinguishers to attempt to contain the fire. 
Christchurch Fire Brigade receive the fire call from Mr 
Boon who advises there is a fire in the cellar. Fire Brigade 
despatch two fire units and a salvage van to the scene. 
Fire Brigade units arrive at scene. 
Fire Brigade prepare one hose to attack the fire. 
Management is advised by executives to clear staff and 
customers but they confined that activity to ground floor 
only. 
J 
3.49 p.m. 
3.50 p.m. 
3.50 p.m. to 
3.53 p.m. 
3.53 p.m. 
3.56 p.m. 
3.57 p.m. 
3.58 p.m. 
3.59 p.m. 
4.00 p.m. 
Fire Brigade ingress to the cellar is impeded by persons 
vacating the building and an alternative route to the cellar 
is sought by management and the officer in charge of the 
Fire Brigade. 
An employee on the 3rd Floor of Pratts Building noticed 
smoke in the fire escape area between Goodmans and Pratts 
building, estimated at 6 feet below level of the third floor. 
Ken Ballantyne arrives at Credit Office, on 3rd Floor of 
Pratts Building, and opened the fire escape finding intense 
heat and smoke. 
Lights start failing on upper floors of Pratts and Goodmans 
building. 
Credit Office staff are instructed to put records away. 
Customers are observed still entering premises via the 
Cashel Street ground floor doors in Pratts Building. 
A staff supervisor leads out 8 millinery room employees 
from the Millinery Department on the 3rd floor of 
Goodmans Building. Only she and one staff member obtain 
safe passage, the rest are overcome by smoke inhalation. 
First known casualties. 
Fire has "blown" and the first water is applied on the fire, at 
the windows of Congreves Building. 
Staff employed in the shirt room on 3rd Floor of Pratts 
Building evacuate via the tailoring department at which time 
the floor is becoming heavily smoke logged. They reach 
safety. 
Flames break through on the 3rd Floor of Pratts Building. 
Witnesses described it as a pillar of fire travelling at running 
speed accompanied by explosions. Flashover has occurred 
in this area and fire becomes fully developed on third floors 
of Pratts and Goodmans Building. 
Fire Service extension ladder arrives at scene .. 
Fire Service turn out units from suburban fire stations. 
Credit Office stairway in Pratts Building is cut off by fire. 
19 staff are trapped inside. 
4.04 p.m. 
4.10 p.m. 
4.15 p.m. 
5.29 p.m. 
Two staff members jump from window of 3rd floor of Pratts 
Building and are seriously injured. A third staff member 
jumps and later dies of injuries. 
Ken Ballantyne rescued by ladder from 3rd Floor of Pratts 
Building. He is the last person to leave the building alive. 
Top floors of Pratts, Goodmans Building collapse to ground 
level. 
Fire is surrounded and bought under control. 
Evident from the sequence of events are : 
1. First fire call is made 15 minutes after fire was discovered. 
2. First evacuation order given 17 minutes after fire discovery but confined 
to ground floor only. 
3. The first water is applied to the fire 11 minutes after brigade arrival and 
26 minutes after fire was discovered. 
4. Approximately 40 minutes after the fire discovery, the top floors of Pratts 
and Goodmans Building have collapsed. 
5. Flashover has occurred on the 3rd floor of Pratts building approximately 
28 minutes after the fire was discovered. 
The attached Plan 6, is a reproduction of the Colombo Street frontage of 
Ballantynes building. The following features are shown : 
A. Basement in Congreves building where fire started. 
B. Enclosed alley and fire escapes between Goodmans building and Pratts 
building. 
C. Millinery room windows where staff were trapped and died. 
D. The Credit Office window where most staff died. 
E. Window from which last rescue was made. 
The photograph is a model of the building made to assist the Royal Commission 
that investigated the circumstances of the fire in 1948. 
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PHOTOGRAPHS 
Photo 1-
Photo 2-
Photo 3 -
Depicts the Colombo Street frontage of the buildings at the height 
of the fire. The 3 buildings are identified. The smoke from the 
first and second floor of Congreves building is substantial, as it is 
on the first floor of Goodmans building. The second floor of 
Goodmans is fully involved in fire. 7 staff members died directly 
above on the third floor of Goodmans building via smoke 
inhalation when their path to the stairway was blocked by smoke 
before flames impinged that area. 
Reduced photo version of 1 above. 
The cashel Street frontage of the building is shown. The magnitude 
of the fire is evident from the size of the building complex shown 
in the photo. 
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a minute into the inferno. A graphic shot of 
to have started. 
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ullke il acene from the London blitz," said one spectator as fin- men and helpers played 6,000 gallons of water a minute Into the inferno. A graphic shot of 
the section of the building in Colombo Street in which the fire is believed to have started. 
The Ca1hel Street frontage, with water flooding the street as hoses are played on the windows from which many people trapped in the blazing building were 
rescued. The heat was so intense that In parts of the building th-e Oamaru stone facing turned Into lime. 
SCENES ON THE TWO FRONTAGES AS THE FIRE IS FOUGHT 
FATALITIES AND STAFF DISPERSIONS 
432 staff were working in the eight buildings which made up the Ballantynes 
complex on the day of the fire. 40 staff were employed in both the Congreves 
and Goodmans building respectively and a further 165 in Pratts building, for a 
total dispersion of 245 in the three main buildings. 
Staff dispersement on the day of the fire, by floor locations was : 
Congreves Goodmans Pratts Total 
Basement 1 - - 1 
Ground Floor 5 14 54 73 
First Floor 1 2 30 33 
Second Floor 33 12 81 126 
Third Floor - 12 - 12 
Total 40 40 165 245 
41 persons perished in the fire of which 38 were employees, 2 were visiting 
auditors and the final fatality being an employee of the College of Retailing who 
occupied an office in the building. 171 staff were employed on floors above 
ground level, in the three buildings. 
Of the 38 staff members who lost their lives, 10 were employed on the 3rd floor 
of Goodmans Building and 28 on the second floor of Pratts Building. 
Floor Employed On Location Where Perished Number 
Credit Office - Accounts/Credit Office - 20 
2nd Floor - Pratts 2nd Floor - Pratts 
Accounts Office - Accounts/Credit Office - 7 
2nd Floor - Pratts 2nd Floor - Pratts 
Display Studio - Accounts/Credit Office - 2 
3rd Floor - Goodmans 2nd Floor - Pratts 
Millinery Dept - Millinery Workroom- 7 
3rd Floor - Goodmans 3rd Floor - Goodmans 
Telephone Exchange - Accounts/Credit Office - 1 
3rd Floor - Goodmans 2nd Floor - Pratts 
Accounts Office - Jumped from window of 1 
2nd Floor - Pratts accounts office 
THE SPREAD OF SMOKE AND FLAME 
Propagation of fire generally means the spreading, extension or continued burning 
of fire by vertical, horizontal or downward directions. 
The general principles of Fire Behaviour are 
1. That fire spreads upwards and outwards. 
2. That it follows the path of least resistance. 
3. Fire spreads vertically and will spread horizontally when vertically its path 
is blocked. 
Vertical spread of fire is caused by the updraft of heated air and gasses through 
open stairways, elevator shafts, vertical openings, ducts, service penetrations, and 
hidden gaps in wall linings and ceilings and via external windows. 
Horizontal spread of fire at the same levels is caused by reason of air currents, 
confinement of fire to that level and adjacent combustible fuel. Open doors, 
concealed spaces, ceiling cavities, service openings and barrier failure will allow 
unimpeded horizontal fire spread. 
The spread of fire will occur via one or more means of heat transfer, namely 
radiation, convection and conduction. 
Applying these principles to Ballantynes Fire a reconstruction of the spread of 
heat, flame and smoke has been researched. 
The fire origin area was the basement of Congreves Building. A vertical spread 
of fire and smoke from the source area has occurred via the stairway of the 
basement to the ground floor, this stairway not being fire stopped. Progression 
of the fire has also been vertical at an early stage via the non fire protected wire 
mesh door giving access to the basement under Goodmans building. The 
Goodmans basement has also provided a means of air access to further propagate 
the fire in the basement, allowing heated products of combustion in increasing 
proportions to rise vertically from Goodmans basement into the lift shaft of that 
building. The lift shaft was enclosed with pinex and the doors of wood with wire 
mesh. Vertical heat transfer has been by way of convection at this stage. 
Fuelled by the heavy fire loading available and the large openings on the first 
floor giving access between all three buildings, the products of combustion (heat, 
smoke, gases) has ascended via unprotected stairs and liftwells to the upper floors 
of the buildings. As the fire has increased in growth it has created a rapid rise 
of combustion gases and heated air producing a partial vacuum thereby pulling 
surrounding air to flow into the base of the fire resulting in a rapid updraft. 
The presence of non fire resistance wall partitioning particularly pinex, plywood 
and match lining on all floors has allowed a rapid growth of fire, causing barrier 
failure allowing the fire to become unconfined very quickly. Further spread has 
occurred via the roofs which had no fire breaks. Wall linings over timber battens 
with 1 inch gaps also assisted the spread of fire and smoke. Surface flame spread 
over partitioning has been rapid as the fire has intensified. 
Further smoke spread occurred via the opening cut in the northern wall of 
Goodmans basement once the soft fibre board surrounding the hole had been 
breached. This smoke spread up the narrow 3 foot alley and was described by 
witnesses as dense and thick. 
Flashover on the third floor of Pratts Building has occurred at 3.58 p.m., 
approximately 28 minutes after the fire was discovered. 
A dangerous and undetected heat and smoke build up occurred on the 
unoccupied first floor of Congreves Building due to a fibre board screen closing 
a lateral opening giving access to Goodmans Building. Once the fibre board 
temporary partition had been breached unimpeded rapid development and spread 
of fire has occurred. 
The rapid build up and spread of smoke, heat and fire rendered fire escapes and 
stairs ineffective because staff were unable to obtain access to them and they were 
blocked by the intensity of the fire, and accumulation of carbon monoxide gasses 
and smoke, particularly on the second and third floors where the majority of 
deaths occurred. Smoke from the hole in Goodmans basement has filled the alley 
between Pratts Building and obstructed the fire escape as it has risen and 
intensified. 
Open windows on the north eastern end of Pratts Building first floor also 
contributed to the rapid growth and spread of fire in that building. 
Perhaps the most significant feature responsible for the rapid build up and 
explosive spread of fire, was the build up of inflammable gases and smoke at an 
early stage on the first floor of Congreves Building. Explosive ignition of these 
gasses would have breached the temporary soft board partition between 
Congreves and Goodmans Building and at that point the fire has blown and was 
beyond control. 
Plans 6 to 9 illustrate in stages the spread of smoke and fire. Plan 6 is a 
sectionalised plan of the buildings, and plans 7 to 9, are floor plans. (Source -
NZ Fire Service, from Report of Commission of Enquiry- prepared by V.R.J. 
Hean and presented as evidence to the Commission). 
The extent of the fire is evident in the photographs. (Sources - NZ Free Lance 
Magazine, Christchurch Star Sun, Christchurch Press). 
Photos 4 and 5 are photographs taken at the time of the fire, defining the 
intensity and size of the fire in the buildings. 
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FIRE PREVENTION AND FIRE SAFETY ASPECTS 
The Ballantynes Complex had a total cubic capacity of 1,873,600 cubic feet and 
the group of buildings occupied an area of approximately one acre. Walker in his 
book, "the Ballantynes Fire Disaster" refers to building codes and by-laws 
applicable in London during the same period when Ballantynes fire occurred. At 
that time, all commercial buildings in London over 250,000 cubic feet capacity, 
by law, were required to have sprinkler systems installed. Walker refers to the 
fact that Ballantynes complex was 7 times greater in size than the buildings in 
London which were required to have sprinkler systems installed. 
Ballantynes complex had no sprinkler system or automatic fire alarm system 
installed in the complex. The benefit of sprinkler systems in Department stores 
is evident from the 1945 USA fire statistics obtained from N.F.P.A. figures, 
"Effect of Sprinklers by Calls of Occupancy". These figures revealed the 
following: 
Total number of fires in sprinklered department 
stores in 1945 
Number extinguished by sprinklers 
Number of fires held in check by sprinklers 
Total fires extinguished/ controlled 
Total fires not held in check by sprinklers 
1416 
1144 
239 
1383 
33 
Of all fires in department stores that had sprinklers installed 97.8% were 
extinguished or checked. It was of interest to note in 1945 statistics that out of 
the 224 occupahcy classes listed, that department stores were 11th on the list for 
the occupancy class having the most number of fires. 
Ballantynes management ran no regular fire drills and fire safety training for staff. 
They had no effective evacuation plan and strategy in the event of fire. 
Management admitted that no emergency fire evacuation plan for staff existed at 
the time of the fire. 
An automatic fire alarm system installed in Pratts building was ineffective, poorly 
maintained and unreliable and fell into disuse and was dismantled in 1928 and 
removed. An improved system was never installed. None of the other buildings 
had alarm systems. 
50 fire extinguishers were distributed throughout the complex servied by the Fire 
Service at 6 monthly intervals. 
Pratts, Congreves and Goodmans Buildings had fire hoses on the roofs of the 
those buildings with there being a further two hoses in the balance of the 
complex. No hoses were in ground floor or storage areas. 
No manual fire alarm bells to warn staff and customers of fire were installed in 
the complex. 
BUILDINGS BY-LAWS AND MEANS OF EGRESS CODES 
Existing at the time of the fire was a New Zealand Standard Code of Building By-
law, Part VII, Means of Egress, which had been prepared by the N.Z. Standards 
Institute. The code contained provisions relating to buildings being designed and 
constructed to provide proper means of egress free of obstructions, separate from 
each other and protected by fire resistant materials, namely protected stairways, 
passage ways and horizontal exists. Fire escape ladders of the type existing at 
Ballantynes were no considered safe under the Code as they did not provide 
complete protection which was what the Code was designed for. The Standard 
was instituted in 1944. 
The Code did not apply to existing buildings but Clause 704 of the Code 
contained provisions that any existing buildings where the means of egress in the 
opinion of an engineer or Fire Officer, were inadequate for safety, then such 
buildings should provide safe means of egress in compliance with the Code. The 
by-law gave Council Engineers authority to instruct compliance only in respect of 
means of egress. 
The Factories Act, also had certain provisions relating to egress, but those 
provisions sanctioned use of external fire escapes, made no provision for fire 
doors and did not require protected stairways and liftwells. The Act and its 
regulations did not allow for installation of protective devices, hazardous 
occupancy or alternative means of egress. It was entirely inadequate in terms of 
safe egress and fire protection. 
The Christchurch City Fire Board also had a by-law relating to escape from 
buildings. The by-law allowed for external fire escapes as being adequate, and 
in the case of then existing buildings that no improvements to safety were 
necessary unless the Fire Superintendant conducted an inspection and served 
notice on a building owner of what was required. 
Between 1945 and 1947 the Fire Board conducted only 36 inspections and 
Ballantynes was not one of them. The City Council was in a position via the 
Municipal Corporations Act to replace the Fire Board By-law with the Code but 
did not do so, thus the Fire Boards By-law was inferior to the Code. 
The only Council by-laws relating to general construction of buildings were made 
in 1916 and 1930 and did not provide for safe construction in reference to fire 
spread, occupancy hazards of the building, and limiting of fire, and fire loads. 
From by-laws and statutes in existence there were no satisfactory provisions in 
respect of construction and design of buildings for public safety or floor areas and 
occupancy. 
The Christchurch City Council had by-law number 40 which provided that "no 
wood or other materials capable of taking fire and burning shall be used as lining 
in the construction of internal walls or partitions", but it did allow 1fainch wooden 
linings to a height of 7 feet from the floor if the studs were covered with non 
inflammable material to that height. The by-law further stipulated that all 
internal walls, partitions and ceilings constructed wholely or partially of wood, be 
./ 
/ 
/ 
covered with metal, fibrous plaster or asbestos sheets or plaster on lathe. 
The making of openings in Ballantynes Buildings, without permit was admitted 
by two building contractors at the Royal Commission Hearings on 20.4.48. At the 
time of the fire C.S. Luney Ltd were constructing an opening between the 
Goodmans and Pratts Cellar. An opening had been made without a permit and 
earth removed creating a hole onto the alleyway between Goodmans and Pratts 
building. In 1945 an opening was made in the walls between the first floor of 
Pratts and Goodmans building. In . both instances alterations were made on 
existing buildings without the necessary permits required by Christchurch City 
. Council By-laws. 
Further alteration work to existing buildings; without permits was done by another 
contractor in 1944 when openings were made in Pratts Building and in 1945 with 
further openings in party walls on Congreves, Goodmans and Pratts buildings. 
Existing openings were also widened. Both contractors admitted that at the time 
they made the openings, they did not give consideration to the question of fire 
hazards being created. 
It was ascertained by the Commission, that in some instances where openings 
were made or enlarged that existing fire doors were removed and not replaced 
with larger ones when work was completed. 
A statement made to the Royal Commission, by Ballantynes architect is 
reproduced from the Christchurch Press, 20-4-48. The architect told the 
Commission that he realised that openings made in the buildings would allow the 
spread of fire "But fire was never uppermost in our thoughts and I must say we 
did not give a great deal of attention to it". This witness did say he was aware of 
the dangers of vertical and lateral openings and unenclosed stairways and lift 
wells and he admitted more attention sh.ould have been given to those dangers 
and the question of fire. 
The City Council issued permits for other alteration work in the buildings and 
much of this work consisted of partitioning. The Council approved the use of soft 
board partitioning and granted dispensation from its own by-laws. 
The Royal Commission found that this soft board was untreated and non fire 
retardent. 
Soft boards used were substantial quantities of pinex, beaverboard, and 
unprotected match lining. These soft boards allowed for rapid surface flame 
spread, being extremely combustible. Many wall linings were also painted, and 
./ 
tests done in 1947 and 1948 determined the painted surfaces burned fiercely. / 
PHOTOGRAPHS 
Photo 6-
Photo 6A-
Is an aerial view of the Ballantynes complex taken a day after the 
fire. The following aspects are noted. 
1. The 8 individual buildings forming the complex are outlined 
by the party walls, which in most instances have withstood 
the fire and not collapsed. 
2. The top floors have collapsed in most of the buildings, 
particularly Pratts building. 
3. Beams still evident in Goodmans building. These are the 
ceiling beams for the second and first floors. 
4. Beams for the second and first floor ceilings m Pratts 
Building are also evident. 
This photo is the same aerial shot with certain features identified 
as shown. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The Ballantynes Disaster occurred as it did because of several factors, which if 
addressed prior to the fire would have significantly reduced the impact of the fire. 
1. That there were no active fire controls and prevention systems in the 
building: 
1.1 No sprinkler systems were installed in a complex with a high fire 
load by construction and content, in a complex of 1,873,600 cubic 
feet. A correctly installed sprinkler system may have doused or 
controlled the initial outbreak of fire in the basement, or confined 
it whilst in its incipient stage. / 
1.2 No automatic fire warning system was installed which could have 
given earlier warning of the fire and direct warning to the Fire 
Service. No smoke detectors were in the buildings. ./ 
1.3 No manual warning bells prevented an alert to all staff being given. ../ 
2. The major contributory factors for the disaster reaching the extent it did 
was the construction and alterations to the buildings. 
2.1 Had lifts and stairs been enclosed in concrete, brick or tilewalls cut 
off from the rest of the building by metal clad and self closing fire 
doors on each floor, the effects of fire would have been contained 
and sectionalised, and confined to the floor on which it started. ,; 
Vertical spread of fire would have been curtailed. 
2.2 Unprotected, non fire retardent and non fire stopped lateral 
openings between all the buildings promoted the rapdi spread of / 
smoke and fire. 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.6 
2.7 
The absence of sufficient fire proof doors assisted the spread of 
smoke and fire. 
Vertical openings were not properly sealed. 
Wall linings were non fire resistant and promoted rapid surface 
spread of flame. 
No installation of fireproof doors at lateral openings prevented the 
fire affected sections being isolated from the remainder of the 
complex, particularly the soft wood temporary partition between 
Congreves and Goodmans Building on the first floor, which was 
probably one of the major contributory factors allowing unimpeded 
spread throughout the complex, and massive breakthrough of fire. 
The electric mains casing was not effectively sealed to prevent heat 
transfer. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/. 
/ 
3. 
2.8 The large size of compartments allowed quick development of fire 
and intense heat build up which would have been exceedingly 
difficult to bring under control. 
2.9 The Building Codes and By-laws of the day had no provisions for 
compliance with such codes or by-laws in respect of existing 
buildings. Some work in extending existing openings and creating 
new openings was done without City Council permits. ./ 
2.10 No inspections were carried out on the building by City Council 
staff or Fire Service personnel and thus the inherent dangers 
outlined were never identified or rectified. 
2.11 In conducting building alteration work Ballantynes and the 
contractors gave little consideration to fire safety. / 
2.12 The verandahs surrounding Ballantynes were angled and sloped and 
this prevented effective use of fire rescue ladders. •1 
2.13 Sloping roofs could not facilitate erection of fire ladders in a safe 
manner to reach upper floors. ./ 
No general evacuation order was given to staff. Staff left on their own 
initiative. Many did not realise the dangers. There was no systematic or 
co-ordinated effort to ensure staff safety at the time of the fire and staff 
were left to their own devices. Many did not appreciate the danger they 
were in, particularly the staff in the Credit and Account offices of Pratts 
Building. The lack of staff awareness, fire drills and evacuation 
procedures contribuJed to the death toll. The staff were untrained and 
totally unprepared in the event of fire. / 
4. That the means of egress did not comply with the Egress Code existing at 
the time, namely NZSS95, Part VII, namely : 
4.1 
4.2 
4.3 
4.4 
Some means of egress were not adequatly protected by fire 
resistant materials. 
Stairways, passageways and horizontal exists were not protected. 
No portions of the building provided sufficient protection by egress 
means on the first, second and third floors. 
Lack of inspection in respect of egress means by the Christchurch 
City Council or Fire Service. Had such inspections been carried 
out, the dangers existing in means of egress points may have been 
identified. 
4.5 Lack of smoke stop partitioning or enclosures at egress points. 
4.6 Insufficient fire escapes installed given the size and capacity of the 
complex. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
4.7 Some egress points were obstructed or blocked preventing access 
to them or use of them. 
4.8 Egress points were unprotected against obstruction by smoke and 
there was no emergency lighting to identify those points where 
smo}<.e blocked visibility. 
4.9 Egresses were of combustible construction. 
4.10 There were a number of pockets in the building were there was 
insufficient egress distribution. 
4.11 There were no alternative means of egress when other points 
became blocked or inaccessible. 
4.12 Staff were not familiar with all egress points. 
In summary this fire could have been reduced in severity and the tragedy averted 
by: 
1. Installation of sprinkler system to extinguish/ contain fire. 
2. Automatic fire alarm to give earlier warning of fire. 
3. Staff training on fire and safe evacuation plan. 
4. Inspection by Fire Board and Council staff of the building in which 
hazards could have been identified and rectified. 
5. Provision of safe means of egress. 
6. Provision of fire stops, and fire doors to compartmentise the complex into 
fire blocks on all floors in all buildings. 
7. Better constructed and more effective by-laws and regulations and 
compliance with same in respect of alterations to existing buildings. 
8. As alterations were made to the buildings at the complex, such alterations 
should have been classed as new construction to bring the alterations 
under the gambit of the Code and not rated as an existing structure. 
9. All vertical openings enclosed and protected. 
10. The non use of highly combustible soft boards for linings and partitionings. 
/ 
/ 
/ 
We have not traversed the cause of the fire which was suspected to be either 
electrical or careless disposal of a cigarette butt. Nor have we examined the role 
of the Fire Brigade in respect of their actions at the scene. We have not examined 
the Fire Brigade role as we believe that if Items 1 to 10 existed in part or in full 
on the date of the fire, the fire would not have been the disaster it was and the 
Fire Brigade would not have been placed in the situation it found itself in. // 
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